POLITICAL CHANGES AND INSURGENCY

Administration and government

The country was now ruled by the Coalition Provisional Authority. One of its first actions was to disband the Iraqi Army and to declare the dismissal of all Baath Party members in government positions. Since a large percentage of employment was government employment and since party membership had been necessary for most jobs, this left a large proportion of the population destitute.

Gradually a parallel Iraqi government was set up in preparation for the establishment of a constitutional democracy. Subsequent elections chose delegates to a constitutional convention, adopted a democratic constitution and elected a president and parliament. Provinces are given considerable independence and provision is made for the establishment of regional governments.

The most critical issue in the creation of the governmental system is the way in which power will be divided among the Sunni Arabs, the Sunni Kurds, and the Shi'a Arabs. Since one or another of these groups dominate in most provinces outside Baghdad, this is a question of how power is divided among different provinces. The legitimacy of the elections has never been accepted by many Sunni Arabs, since they had always assumed they were the largest religious group. The elections have, however, supported the calculations of outside observers that about 15% of the people were Sunni Kurds, perhaps 20% Sunni Arabs and 60% Shi'a Arabs, and 5% other. (The figures have a way of not adding up, see Wikipedia.) The divisions of power attained through the voting and horse trading led to a government dominated by Shi'a, but with important positions in the hands of others. Unfortunately, ministries controlled by one or another group tend to serve only that group--an especially bad situation when the ministry is the interior (Shi'a). Many problems remain unresolved, particularly the division of the oil revenue.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Since the end of the mopping-up operations in 2003, the Iraq war has been transformed into an insurgency. At first, the response of coalition forces was primarily the Vietnam approach of finding and destroying the enemy, with "good" kill-ratios the measure of success. But gradually Coalition forces came to realize that they were fighting a war in which "winning the hearts and minds" of the people was paramount. Since they knew that as foreigners, they could never be close to the people, Coalition forces began to concentrate on training police and army units. However, limited success here, together with the apparent sectarian loyalty of many units, has reduced hopes for a rapid transfer of security to the Iraqis. American units are now to take the lead in clearing and securing population areas for extended periods of time. This approach initially requires more American troops, a requirement to be met by reducing offensive actions and increasing the total American contingent in Iraq. Considering the scale of the killing and the adaptability of the opponent, whether this will be too little, too late, is unclear.

The task has been complicated by the complexity of the insurgent forces arrayed against the Americans and the civilians caught in between. At first, most insurgents were elements of the former army and members of the former ruling Baath party. Later, some Shi'a units, especially those of Moqtada al-Sadr, fought pitched battles with the Americans. But most insurgents seem to represent a loose confederation of persons identifying with al-Qaeda (often with foreign recruits) and nationalism. Both want to prove to the people that the Americans cannot defend them. The goal is apparently to restore the honor either of Islam (al-Qaeda) or Iraq. Attacks of Shi'a on Sunni and vice-versa with little regard to the Americans adds another layer of complexity. But all of these layers are in theory controllable by the same secure and hold strategy that we have now adopted.

sources:

CIA:World Factbook: Iraq, 2007.

Wikipedia: Iraq War.

Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, Penguin Press, 2006.